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Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action
Sara Rachel Chant and Zachary Ernst
Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of
agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs
about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called ‘in-
teractive knowledge’ is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writ-
ers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive
knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account is necessary for any ade-
quate analysis of collective intention. Furthermore, we argue that an application of
Robert Aumann’s theory of interactive knowledge may be used to address several
puzzling features of collective intention. 
Introduction
Actions undertaken by groups often require the epistemic states of the
agents in the group to depend appropriately on the epistemic states of
other agents in the group. For example, we may successfully coordinate
our meeting only on the condition that we both know where the meet-
ing is to take place, and that we know the other person knows this. Such
situations are not unusual—there are important classes of cases in
which interdependence among our beliefs is precisely what marks the
difference between a collective action and an arbitrary set of actions
performed by individuals.
Thus, Michael Bratman (, ), Margaret Gilbert (), Chris-
topher Kutz (), and Raimo Tuomela (, ), have each sug-
gested that in order for a group to perform a collective action, the
members of that group must satisfy certain epistemic conditions.1
Tuomela, for example, argues that acting together may require higher-
order ‘loop beliefs’ in which I believe that you will participate in the
performance of the act, I believe that you believe that I will participate,
and so on (Tuomela , p. ). If such higher-order beliefs are indeed
1 A variety of different terms referring to such actions have been adopted in the action theory
literature, including ‘collective action’, ‘joint action’, ‘social action’, and ‘shared cooperative
activity’. Although these different terms often have different meanings, we shall refer to any action
brought about by a group of agents, and requiring coordination among those agents, as a ‘collec-
tive action’.
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necessary for the performance of collective actions, then it is important
to understand the conditions that make those epistemic states possible.
In this paper, we shall concentrate on so-called ‘interactive knowledge’,
which refers to the knowledge possessed by one agent about the knowl-
edge possessed by another agent.
In work that deserves more attention from philosophers, the econo-
mist Robert Aumann has developed a formal theory of interactive
knowledge (Aumann a, b). Although some aspects of his theory
are controversial, we shall argue that it provides a useful framework for
thinking about interactive knowledge and its role in producing collec-
tive action. In section , we briefly review the most influential accounts
of collective intention, highlighting the central role played by interactive
knowledge in these accounts. Section  considers a case in which
rational agents can never coordinate their actions despite achieving
arbitrarily high degrees of interactive knowledge. This case, known as
the ‘Coordinated Attack Problem’, will motivate our argument that there
is no simple, common-sense criteria for specifying what level of interac-
tive knowledge is necessary for collective action. In section , we briefly
sketch Aumann’s theory of interactive knowledge. In section , we argue
that the level of interactive knowledge required for collective action
depends on the strategic situation in which the agents are supposed to
act. In fact, we shall see that there are counterintuitive (but realistic) sit-
uations in which interactive knowledge prevents collective action, rather
than enabling it. Section  discusses an objection that has been made
against Michael Bratman’s theory of ‘shared cooperative activity’. We
argue that Bratman’s response, while sound, can be strengthened and
generalized if we take into account how interactive knowledge is gener-
ated by a group. The final section of the paper briefly outlines a few
open problems that would benefit from a similar approach.
1. The importance of interactive knowledge in philosophical 
action theory
A common strategy for analysing the concept of collective action is to
assume that just as individual intentions play an important role in the
explanation of individual action, so too collective intentions play an
important role in the explanation of collective action. But the concept
of a collective intention is far from clear. Accordingly, there is little
agreement among the analyses as to the exact nature of collective inten-
tions or whether collective intentions exist in any meaningful sense at
all. However, there is an important point upon which most accounts of
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collective intention agree—namely, that collective intentions require
that the agents’ beliefs depend in some appropriate way on the other
agents’ beliefs.2
Michael Bratman’s analysis of collective intentions is representative
of this approach. In summarizing his view of collective intentions, Brat-
man writes:
[Collective intentions] are interlocking in the sense that we each intend both
that our J-ing proceed by way of each person’s relevant intentions and that
these intentions appropriately mesh. I also supposed that this interlocking
web of intentions would be out in the open, a matter of common knowl-
edge.3 (Bratman , p. )
This requirement that the ‘web of intentions’ be ‘out in the open’ is
something that Bratman has elaborated upon in various places. In his
article, ‘Shared Cooperative Activity’, he says that:
In [shared cooperative activity] the fact that there is this mutually uncoerced
system of intentions will be in the public domain. It will be a matter of com-
mon knowledge among the participants. I will know that we have these in-
tentions, you will know that we have these intentions, I will at least be in a
position to know that you know this, and so on. (Bratman , p. )
Other writers on collective action have introduced similar requirements
on collective intention. To take another example, Christopher Kutz has
introduced a requirement that he calls ‘mutual openness’. This require-
ment is motivated in much the same way as is Bratman’s common
knowledge requirement. In discussing an example in which two agents
wish to coordinate their plans, Kutz says that:
… for our going to Chicago together to be joint, we each must believe it at
least possible the other knows of or will try to predict our choice, and be fa-
vorably disposed to the other’s knowledge of anticipation of that
choice … our individual aims are furthered rather than frustrated by the
other’s awareness. (Kutz , p. )
On Kutz’s view, the requirement of ‘mutual openness’ is supposed to be
weaker than Bratman’s common knowledge requirement, because there
are cases in which it may be possible for two agents to coordinate their
2 The most important exception to this generalization is the theory advocated by John Searle,
who argues that collective intentions are primitives in the heads of individual agents (Searle 
and ). Indeed, it is an implication of his theory that a person might have a collective intention
even though there are no other individuals with whom she can share that intention. For the pur-
pose of this paper, however, we shall discuss only the more common strategy of assuming that
there must be some appropriate relationship between the beliefs of the various agents in the
group.
3 It is important to note that Bratman explicitly says that he is not using the term ‘common
knowledge’ in the precise sense first defined by David Lewis ().
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actions without knowledge of what the other agent is going to do—as
in cases where the right choice is highly salient to both parties. How-
ever, in spite of the weakness of this requirement, it is still the case that
some sort of interactive knowledge is taken to contribute to the forma-
tion of a collective intention. Interactive knowledge ‘furthers’ rather
than ‘frustrates’ the agents’ attempts to coordinate their actions.
Raimo Tuomela’s analysis of collective intentions also contains a sim-
ilar belief requirement. According to Tuomela, a group of agents has a
collective intention if and only if the members of the collective have the
right kind of individual intention, which he has termed a ‘we-inten-
tion’. And in order for an individual to have a we-intention, she must
‘believe that there is … a mutual belief among the participating mem-
bers of [the group] … to the effect that the joint action opportunities
for an intentional performance of X will obtain … ’ (Tuomela ,
p. ). Here, Tuomela uses the term ‘mutual belief ’ in the sense that
there is a mutual belief that p if everyone in the group believes that p.
Thus, Tuomela’s account demands a certain kind of interactive knowl-
edge in requiring that an agent believe that there is a mutual belief
among the members of the group.
2. The Coordinated Attack Problem
One might suspect that the details of interactive knowledge do not mat-
ter to an analysis of collective intentions. For example, one might sup-
pose that there is some requisite threshold level of interactive
knowledge — perhaps vague — at which collective intention (and
thereby, collective action) becomes possible. If this were true, then writ-
ers on collective action could simply assume a particular kind of inter-
active knowledge, and safely avoid discussing any messy details.
However, the details do matter. In this section, we review a particularly
striking example in which only the highest form of interactive knowledge
is sufficient for the agents to form the requisite collective intention. The
‘Coordinated Attack Problem’, which originated in the distributed sys-
tems literature (see Halpern a), and which later attracted attention in
the economics literature (see Rubinstein ; Binmore and Samuelson
), demonstrates a situation in which collective action is impossible
because the necessary epistemic conditions cannot be met. The example
is useful for the current philosophical project because it demonstrates
important effects of interactive knowledge upon collective action. It
thereby supports our contention that an account of interactive knowl-
edge is necessary for a satisfactory account of collective action.
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2.1 The structure of the Coordinated Attack Problem
It is frequently assumed that in a coordination problem, the agents have
‘common knowledge’ of the relevant features of the situation. For
example, David Lewis’s seminal  study of conventions makes this
assumption. A standard interpretation4 of Lewis’s concept of common
knowledge is that a proposition p is common knowledge if and only if:
(everyone knows that)np
for all values of n. In other words, not only does everybody know that p,
but everybody knows that everybody knows that p, and so on. Indeed,
this common knowledge assumption, and the corresponding definition
of common knowledge, have become standard. For example, it is
standard to assume that the strategic features of a situation—including
payoffs, risks, and so on—are ‘common knowledge’ in Lewis’s sense.5
Economists have long appreciated that the assumption of common
knowledge is not innocuous. The so-called ‘Coordinated Attack
Problem’6 is a striking example of this fact. It is a case in which com-
mon knowledge is required for action, but in which it is impossible for
the agents to elevate a piece of information to the status of common
knowledge. And this is in spite of the fact that the agents can communi-
cate with each other indefinitely, have the same interests, and con-
sciously aim to coordinate their beliefs and actions.
The example asks us to imagine that two allied armies are com-
manded by two generals (G and G). In the valley below, the enemy is
encamped. General G knows that the enemy is below, and also knows
that they will be victorious only if both generals attack at the same time.
If either G or G attacks the enemy alone, the attacking general’s army
will be defeated in a disastrous battle. On the other hand, if both attack
simultaneously, they will win an easy victory. Thus, G and G face the
problem of coordinating their attack. Communication between the two
generals is through a messenger who can relay written messages
between them. However, there is a small, but positive, probability c
that the messenger will be unsuccessful in relaying any particular mes-
sage from one general to another (he may be shot by the enemy or
4 We say that this is a ‘standard interpretation’ instead of simply attributing this concept to
Lewis because he does not formulate his concept of ‘common knowledge’ in exactly this way,
although it is commonly represented in this way.
5 For example, in Nash’s groundbreaking treatment of the equilibrium concept, the use of equi-
libria is justified, in part, by assuming that the agents have common knowledge of the game struc-
ture and common knowledge of each others’ rationality (see Nash  and ).
6 For our purposes here, the ‘Electronic Mail Game’ would serve equally well (see Halpern
a).
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become lost, for example). We also assume that whenever a message is
received by one of the generals, a confirmation message is automatically
sent to the other general, and that confirmation message has the same
small probability c of failing to reach its destination. It is an important
feature of the example that the confirmation messages are sent auto-
matically until one of them fails to reach its destination.
It is a surprising fact (proven in Rubinstein  and Halpern a)
that, under these conditions, the generals cannot successfully coordi-
nate their attack; this remains true no matter what finite number of
confirmation messages are sent and received. We may show this by
induction on the number of messages n received by G. Suppose that
n = . Then G knows that either no messages were sent by G, or that
one message was sent by G, but that it failed to get through. If the
former is true, then it is clearly best for G to not attack because G has
no intention of attacking. If the latter, then the situation is slightly more
complicated. Because confirmation messages are sent automatically, G
knows that G will not receive a confirmation message. Without such a
confirmation message, G will reason that one of the following two
cases must be true:
() G’s message did not reach G. This has a probability of c.
() G’s message reached G, but G’s confirmation message did not
reach G. This has a probability of c(!c).
Because c>c(!c), then G will believe that option () is more proba-
ble. But because G will not attack if no message is received, then G will
not attack if G believes that G received no message. Therefore, G will
not attack. This fact is known to G, so G will not attack, either. This
completes the basis case of the proof.
For the inductive step, we suppose that there is some n such that if n
messages are received by G, then neither G nor G will attack. Now
suppose that exactly n+ messages are received by G. In this case, G
will not receive a confirmation message for message (n+), and this
fact is known by G. G knows that G will be faced with considering
two options, which are closely analogous to () above, namely:
() G’s first n messages reached G, but the (n+)th message did
not. This has a probability of c(!c)n.
() G’s message reached G, but G’s final confirmation message
did not reach G. This has a probability of c(!c)
n+.
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At this point, G believes that G’s line of reasoning will be the same as in
the basis case. Option () is more probable because c(!c)n >c(!c)n+,
so G believes that G believes that G probably did not receive the n
th
message. But according to the inductive hypothesis, neither general will
attack under that condition. This completes the inductive step. So no
matter how many messages are sent and received, neither general will
attack.
The conclusion that the generals cannot coordinate their attack is
highly counterintuitive.7 But it does provide a rigorous demonstration
of the most extreme possible case in which nothing short of full-blown
common knowledge is sufficient for collective action.
On the other end of spectrum, it is easy to come up with cases in
which a minimal level of interactive knowledge is necessary. For exam-
ple, consider a simple case in which one choice is particularly salient.
Two friends staying in the same hotel in a strange city get separated. It
is obvious that they may be perfectly capable of meeting up together
again at the hotel rather than, say, at a local landmark. The reason is
that this choice is highly salient to both people. For our purposes here,
we note that only a minimal level of interactive knowledge is necessary
for them to achieve this coordination. Perhaps each needs only believe
that the other person is capable of reaching the hotel, for example. No
other peculiar features of the situation force them to acquire higher lev-
els of interactive knowledge.
2.2 Issues raised by the Coordinated Attack Problem
By themselves, these two examples are sufficient to establish a negative
thesis concerning the role of interactive knowledge in generating collec-
tive intentions. This is simply that there is no unique threshold level of
interactive knowledge at which collective intentions are formed.
Whether a particular level of interactive knowledge is sufficient
depends upon the details of the situation in which the agents find
themselves.
7 In fact, it has been our experience that many philosophers of action are violently resistant to
this conclusion. For those seeking a more rigorous demonstration, we refer the reader to Ruben-
stein’s () proof and Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson’s excellent  discussion.
But in order to alleviate some of the discomfort surrounding this example, we point out that
there are several assumptions in the Coordinated Attack Problem that are unrealistic. For example,
it is necessary to assume that the generals can iterate their line of argument indefinitely, any finite
number of times. It also assumes that the confirmation messages are sent automatically, any num-
ber of times. For the purposes of our discussion here, these assumptions are unimportant. We
merely use the example to show that epistemic conditions for collective action may depend upon a
variety of different factors, and that the epistemic conditions for collective action may be difficult
to satisfy in some cases.
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This observation thereby raises important questions for any account
of collective intention. For example, if interactive knowledge is central
to an account of collective intention, then we need to understand what
features of the strategic situation determine the level of interactive
knowledge required. Additionally, the paradoxical nature of the Coor-
dinated Attack Problem raises the issue of when, if ever, full-blown
common knowledge is required in realistic settings. And if common
knowledge is ever a prerequisite for generating a collective intention,
then we must ask how such knowledge becomes possible. Without
answers to these questions, no account of collective intention (and
thereby collective action) is complete.
3. Formalization of interactive knowledge
In order to address these questions, we require a framework for analys-
ing interactive knowledge. Formal interactive epistemology contains
both a syntax and a semantics for describing the effects of one agent’s
knowledge about another agent’s knowledge. In what follows, we shall
use the theory of interactive epistemology due to Aumann. Although
there are some controversial assumptions implicit in Aumann’s formal-
ism, we shall argue that it provides a flexible and useful way of thinking
about collective action and its epistemic conditions. And despite those
assumptions, Aumann’s work helps identify crucial assumptions that
must be questioned on any satisfactory analysis of collective intention
and action.
3.1 Semantics of interactive knowledge
In interactive epistemology, an agent’s knowledge is identified as the set
of states that that she considers possible.8 Let V be the set of all the pos-
sible states of the world v, and let I = {,, … , n} be a set of agents.
Events are identified with subsets of V. For example, if V consists of all
the possible ways that the weather might be tomorrow, then the event
of its raining tomorrow is identified with the set consisting of all the
elements v!V that are states in which it rains tomorrow. For each indi-
vidual agent i!I, we make the following observations and definitions in
terms of the set of states V.
First, we allow that the agents might be unable to differentiate among
some of the elements of V. For example, we might imagine a situation
in which a die is cast, and an agent is told only whether the die has
landed on an even or an odd number. In this case, we define the set of
8 For excellent surveys, see Geanokoplos  and Koessler .
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possible rolls of the die V={,, … ,}. Suppose that the die is cast and
lands on . Then the actual state of the world is v=. But since the
agent i is told only that the die landed on an even number, then i knows
only that the real state of the world is some v9!{,,}. We represent
this incomplete knowledge by defining agent i ’s knowledge function
ki :V !3(V), where 3(V) is the set of all subsets of V. If the true state
of the world is v, then ki(v) is the set of all v9!V that i considers pos-
sible. So in our example, ki()={,,  }.
The function ki induces a partitioning of V into subsets of worlds
between which i cannot differentiate. In the above example, the agent
cannot differentiate between states , , and  (since she is told only
whether the die has landed on an even or an odd number). Similarly,
she cannot differentiate between , , and . So ki partitions V into
{,,} and {,,}. This set of partitions is defined by the function Ii as
follows:
() Ii(v)={v9!V |ki(v)=ki(v9)}
It is helpful to single out the partition of possible worlds that i consid-
ers possible, given the actual state of the world. This partition is i ’s
information partition, and is designated Ii.
As we have said, an event E is identified with the set of possible
worlds in which that event happens. Accordingly, Aumann’s theory of
interactive epistemology makes use of the following definition of an
agent’s knowledge:
Definition 1. An agent i knows an event E if and only if every world i
considers possible is a (possibly improper) subset of E . Formally, i
knows that E if and only if ki(v) " E , where v is the actual world.
In order to employ this account for interactive knowledge (that is, for
situations in which i knows that j knows that … ), an agent’s knowing
an event must itself be an event, so that this epistemic state can itself be
the object of an agent’s knowledge. So the following definition is
required:
Definition 2. The event of i ’s knowing that E , denoted KiE , is the set
of all worlds that i considers possible, and where the event E obtains.
Formally, KiE={v |v!Ii and v!E}
We now show how interactive knowledge is represented in this theory.
Theorem 1. For agents i, j, and an event E , i knows that j knows that E
if and only if kj(ki(v)) " E.
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Proof. We follow the proof in Geanakoplos . First, we prove the
‘only if ’ direction. Suppose i knows that j knows that E . Now assume
for reductio that there is some world v9!ki(v)which i considers pos-
sible such that kj(v9) " E . But if so, then ‘from the perspective’ of i,
v9 has the following two properties:
() v9 is a world i considers possible, and
() if v9 were the actual world, then j ’s knowledge function
would have it be the case that E might be false, and hence, E
could not be known to j. But this is contrary to the assump-
tion that j knows that E .
This suffices to show the first direction. We now show the ‘if ’ direc-
tion (by contraposition). Suppose that i does not know that j knows
that E . Then there is some v9!ki(v) such that kj(v9) " E is false. But
then, it is also false that kj(ki(v)) " E .
Since Theorem () gives us a method for representing higher-order
knowledge, we now rehearse some standard definitions.
Definition 3. An event E is mutual knowledge among agents
I={,, … ,n} if and only if ki(v) " E , for all i!I. E is known to level k
among the members of I if and only if for all m#k, and every series
x,x, … xm with each xi! I, it is true that ( ( … (v) … )
… ) " E. E is common knowledge among the members of I if and only
if E is known to level m, for all m!N. E is almost common knowledge
if E is known to level k, and k is large but finite.
3.2 Interactive knowledge theses
We may now state the following (appropriately controversial) theses
about knowledge.
(A1) Ki(E#F) = KiE#KiF (Distribution Axiom) An agent knows a
conjunction if and only if she knows both conjuncts.
(A2) KiE"E (Truth Axiom) If an agent knows a proposition, then
that proposition is true. 
(A3) KiE" E (Introspection Axiom) If an agent knows a proposi-
tion, then she knows that she knows it.
(A4) KiE"KiKiE (Wisdom Axiom) If an agent does not know a
proposition, then she knows that she does not know it.
kx kx kxm
Ki

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In the interests of full disclosure, we note here that theses (A)–(A),
although highly dubious, are validated by any semantics of common
knowledge that uses information partitions in the way we have outlined
above. However, when we apply this framework below, our arguments
will not depend upon any of them.
Theorem 2. Theses (A)–(A) are validated by the knowledge seman-
tics above.
Proof. We show that (A) is valid. Suppose that KiE, but that KiKiE is
false. So Ki E = {v | ki (v) and v ! E }. But by the same token,
KiKiE = {v |ki(ki(v)) and v ! ki(E)}. But clearly, the latter is a (pos-
sibly improper) subset of the former. The remaining theses follow
analogously.
4. Applications of interactive knowledge
Aumann’s theory is valuable because it enables us to inquire more pre-
cisely into the epistemic requirements for collective action. Those epis-
temic requirements, so we shall begin to argue in this section,
illuminate several important issues in philosophical action theory.
4.1 Specifying the level of interactive knowledge
In order to analyse the concept of collective action, we must specify
what distinguishes mere collections of actions from a single collective
action. It is clear from any reasonable set of examples that an important
distinction between mere collections of actions and collective actions
will make recourse to the beliefs that agents have about the beliefs of
the other agents in the collective. For example, if several people happen
to show up at a restaurant at the same time, they do not do so because
they have any particular beliefs about the other people at the restau-
rant. But on the other hand, when a group deliberately meets at a res-
taurant in order to have lunch together, each individual shows up at the
appointed time because each believes of the others that they believe that
it is the appointed place and time. In such cases, the presence of inter-
active knowledge is an important mark of collective action.
While interactive knowledge marks this important distinction, some
writers on collective action have left the notion as an unanalysed
assumption in their analyses. For example, Michael Bratman (,
p. ) notes the importance of interactive knowledge, but specifically
leaves aside the issue of how to characterize it.
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Rather than leaving it as an undefined primitive, other writers specify
exactly what level of interactive knowledge is required for the perform-
ance of a collective action. For example, in his discussion of ‘joint
intentions’ (which we have been calling more generically ‘collective
intentions’), Tuomela appears to specify a particular level of interactive
knowledge. In discussing his taxonomy of intentions, he argues that
agents have a joint intention if and only if each one has a particular
kind of individual intention, which he calls a ‘we-intention’, and those
we-intentions are related to each other in a particular way. His criterion
for when a group of agents has a joint intention is the following:
Agents A, … , Ai, … , Am have the joint intention to perform a joint
action X if and only if:
(a) these agents have the we-intention (or are disposed to form
the we-intention) to perform X; and
(b) there is a mutual belief among them to the effect that (a).
(Tuomela , p. )
Because of the specificity of condition (b), Tuomela’s analysis implies
the existence of a specific threshold level of interactive knowledge that
is necessary and sufficient for satisfying the epistemic conditions for the
formation of a so-called ‘joint intention’.
Another commonly employed strategy is to require full-blown com-
mon knowledge (in Lewis’s sense) for the performance of a collective
action, while leaving open the possibility that there may be cases in
which something short of this high level of interactive knowledge is
required. Here, the motivating idea seems to be that if some level of
interactive knowledge is required for collective action, then certainly
full-blown common knowledge would also be sufficient—after all, if
an agent has common knowledge, then it is logically entailed that they
also possess every weaker form of interactive knowledge as well. Chris-
topher Kutz is an example of a writer whose theory falls into this cate-
gory, since (as we have seen above) he assumes that higher levels of
interactive knowledge will facilitate collective action.
4.1.1 When (interactive) ignorance is bliss
However, all three of these approaches have serious drawbacks. Con-
sider the third approach. Although it seems reasonable to suppose that
common knowledge will facilitate collective action, this is not always
the case. Consider the following example. Two agents—A and B—are
to decide whether to make a wager, which is depicted in Figure .
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The wager is to guess whether the point p is located inside the dashed
lines; player A wins $ from player B if point p is inside the lines, and
player B wins $ from A otherwise. The nine squares in Figure  repre-
sent the information partitions for both players (so we assume that
VA=VB). Recall that an information partition contains states of affairs
among which an agent cannot differentiate. Thus, even if the players
knew the square precisely in which point p is located, neither would
know the exact location of p. So we assume that a player will accept the
bet if and only if she judges it more likely than not that she will win.
After the bet has been placed, the precise location of point p is revealed,
and the winner collects her payoff from the loser.
Initially, Player A knows only that p is within column a, and Player B
knows only that p is within row b. Accordingly, both A and B are will-
ing to accept the bet—for most points in a are inside the dashed figure
(inducing A to accept the bet), while most points inside b are not
(which induces B to accept). But if they repeatedly learn that the other
player is willing to accept the bet, then the situation changes. For sup-
pose A announces her willingness to accept the bet. Then B knows that
A knows that p is not in the region a (or else A would not have been
willing to accept the bet). But still, B is willing to accept, since she now
knows that point p must be within either (b,a) or (b,a). Most points
in (b,a) and (b,a) are outside the dashed lines, so B is willing to
accept the bet. Suppose that B announces her willingness to accept.
Now A knows that B knows that A is willing to accept the bet, and A
knows that B ’s knowledge does not prevent her from accepting. So A
Player B
Player A
b
b
b
a a a
p
Figure 1: A wager in which Player A has knowledge of the column
of point p, and Player B has knowledge of the row of point p
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can reason that p cannot be in b or b. So now, A knows that point p is
in (b,a). But when A announces his continued willingness to accept
the bet, B will infer that the point must be inside (b,a). And because
this information would give the advantage to Player A, Player B will call
off the bet. Thus, in spite of the fact that both players were initially will-
ing to accept the bet, the bet is now off.
In this example, each announcement by a player creates higher-order
knowledge. Initially, the players have different information sets, and
lack even mutual knowledge about the probable location of point p. But
as they repeatedly announce their willingness to accept the wager, they
generate higher-order knowledge and their information sets gradually
converge. As soon as their knowledge is close enough to common
knowledge given the coarseness of V, they are unable to agree on the
wager. Therefore, we have an example in which a collective action
(making a wager) can take place only if the agents lack higher-order
knowledge.
Furthermore, the example can be straightforwardly modified so that
higher-order interactive knowledge facilitates collective action. Suppose
that the players are no longer making a wager against each other.
Instead, let us suppose that players A and B are both betting against a
third party C. If both A and B accept the offer, then they will each win
$ if point p is outside the dashed lines. If they both accept and point p
is inside the dashed lines, then each has to pay C $. But if either A or B
is unwilling to accept the wager, then the bet is off.
As before, suppose that A initially knows only that p is within a,
while B knows only that p is within b. Initially, therefore, A is unwilling
to accept the wager, while B is. But if they repeatedly announce their
willingness or unwillingness to accept the bet with C, then eventually
both A and B will be willing to make the wager. Therefore, this is a case
in which higher-order knowledge facilitates collective action.
At this point, we need to address a possible worry regarding our use
of a competitive activity—namely, gambling—as a form of coopera-
tive behavior. After all, it is reasonable to see activities such as gambling
as ones that are the opposite of collective actions. Indeed, one might be
tempted to say that any activity in which the individuals’ interests
conflict cannot be a collective action in the relevant sense. To address
this issue, it is useful to consider a discussion from John Searle:
It is worth noticing in passing that most forms of competitive and aggressive
behavior are forms of higher level cooperation. Two men engaged in a prize
fight are engaged in a form of competition, but it is a form of aggressive com-
petition that exists only within a higher level form of cooperation. Each prize
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fighter has the intention to hurt the other, but they have these intentions
only within the frame of the higher order intention to cooperate with each
other in engaging in a prize fight. This is the distinction between a prize fight
and a case of one man simply assaulting another man in a dark alley. And
what goes for the prize fight also goes for football games, business competi-
tions, courtroom trials, and in many cases, even armed warfare. For human
beings, most social forms of aggressive behavior require higher level cooper-
ation. (Searle , p. )
In the above passage, Searle is pointing out that even in activities in
which the individuals’ interests conflict, there is often a higher-order set
of rules to which the agents conform. In such cases, the higher-order
rules may be a precondition for the competitive activity.
To take Searle’s example, if two prize fighters do not cooperate in
respecting the rules of the competition (e.g. by returning to their respec-
tive corners when the bell rings), then they cannot engage in the fight.
Similarly, two individuals cannot gamble if they do not cooperate in con-
forming to the (perhaps unspoken) rules of gambling. So if one were to
focus on the competitive, lower-level aspects of the activity, one would
miss the equally important cooperative preconditions of the activity.
Although it may be surprising that there are cases in which higher-
order knowledge either blocks or facilitates collective action, this exam-
ple actually illustrates a very general phenomenon—and one that is
illuminated by Aumann’s theory of interactive knowledge. In a result
that is well-known in economics, but which is underappreciated by
philosophers concerned with collective action, Aumann has shown the
following:
Theorem 3. Suppose two agents A and B assign common prior prob-
abilities for an event E. Suppose that after receiving (possibly
different) information about the probability of E, and that after re-
ceiving this information, the probabilities that they assign to E are
PA(E) and PB(E). If they have common knowledge of these subjective
probabilities, then PA(E) = PB(E).
Proof. See Aumann b.
Theorem () is relevant to theories of collective action because it shows
that when two or more rational agents have common knowledge of each
others’ subjective probability assignments, then they will necessarily
agree on those probabilities. Hence, if the two agents are in a situation
where such agreement facilitates collective action, then common knowl-
edge will also facilitate collective action. But as we have seen in the gam-
bling example, it is easy to come up with cases in which collective action
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is blocked when the agents agree on the probability assessments. In cases
of this type, common knowledge of each others’ subjective probability
assignments will block collective action. In this way, Theorem () gives
us a general reason to be sceptical of any account of collective action,
which, like the theory offered by Kutz, assumes that high levels of inter-
active knowledge always facilitate collective action.
4.1.2 When is common knowledge appropriate? 
So far, we have learned two lessons. First, the Coordinated Attack Prob-
lem shows that it is not always possible for two agents to reach a state of
common knowledge, even when it is in their best interests to perform a
collective action, and even when they are able to achieve any finite level
of interactive knowledge. Second, there are cases in which common
knowledge is deleterious to collective action. This is the lesson we learn
from the gambling example depicted in Figure . Thus, it is reasonable
to wonder under what conditions rational agents will be able to acquire
common knowledge. Here, too, interactive epistemology is useful.
An example will help to make this clear. Consider the game depicted
in Figure , which we shall call the ‘Risk Game’.
In this situation, the players get a positive payoff for coordinating their
actions on either a or b. But if a player chooses either a or b, and the
other player does not match her choice, then the player is penalized by
receiving a – payoff. However, the option c is available to any player as
an ‘outside option’. If a player chooses option c, then she receives the
status quo payoff of , regardless of the choice of her partner.
In a Risk Game, it is not enough for the players to conditionalize
their actions upon some outside signal, as in the Coordination Game.
For a risk-averse player may judge that even though she received the
signal, her partner might not have received it. In that situation, she
Player B
–,– –,,
–,–
,– ,
–,,
,–
a b c
a
b
c
Player A
Figure 2: The Risk Game: A game in which some level of interac-
tive knowledge is required if risk-averse players are to coordinate
their actions
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risks receiving the – penalty. Importantly, this is true even if both play-
ers successfully receive the signal, because each player will play either a
or b only if she knows that the other player also received the signal.
Thus, mutual knowledge may be insufficient for coordination in a Risk
Game, especially if the risk is very great.
Of course, if both players were to coordinate their actions on (say)
choice a, then it would be natural to interpret their joint behavior as a
collective action. In fact, we may fairly consider the Coordinated Attack
problem to be an extreme case of a Risk Game, and we judge that, had
the generals coordinated their attack, then they would thereby have
performed a collective action.
Indeed, it is often the role of public signals to establish common
knowledge. To illustrate, note that one of the paradoxical features of the
Coordinated Attack Problem is that the two generals are unable to
establish common knowledge in spite of their sophisticated message
schemes; in contrast, there are many cases in which it is easy for two
agents to establish common knowledge. For example, suppose that the
two generals are on high hilltops, and that one general signals to the
other by raising a flag. Suppose further that each knows that anyone on
a hilltop can see the flag, and that they both see each other standing on
their respective hilltops. In this sort of situation, they have all the beliefs
necessary to answer affirmatively any question of the form, ‘does the
other General know that I know that … observed the flag?’ Thus, they
have common knowledge that the flag was raised.9
In cases in which there is a public signal, and it is possible for all the
agents to observe each other observing the signal, common knowledge
may be easy to come by. This either aids or hinders the performance of
the collective action, depending on the structure of the underlying stra-
tegic situation. However, there is another option that applies to more
cases—this is when the agents display bounded rationality.
It is a peculiar feature of the Coordinated Attack Problem that for
any n " m, the agents are able to differentiate between nth-order and
mth-order knowledge. Although this may be a reasonable assumption
so long as m and n are very small, it is clearly too much to require that
(say) an agent calculates based upon fifty-seventh-order knowledge,
and distinguishes that knowledge from fifty-eighth-order knowledge.10
9 For a detailed explanation of how common knowledge arises in such a situation, see Lewis
, Ch. , in which Lewis details the argument that each individual would use when reasoning
about each other’s knowledge.
10 It is therefore an important empirical question whether human beings frequently differenti-
ate between nth-order and n+th-order knowledge, for large values of n. Colin Camerer has taken
up this question in his .
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However, even if agents are unable to calculate beyond a small, finite
degree of interactive knowledge, we are confronted with the question of
whether that limitation facilitates or blocks any particular instance of col-
lective action. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, this limitation trans-
forms higher-order knowledge into common knowledge, and thereby
may facilitate collective action. In particular, we have the following result.
Theorem 4. Let G be a group of agents, all of whom have a finite
number of information partitions. There exists a finite number n
such that if the members of G have interactive knowledge to level n of
an event E, then E is common knowledge among G.
Proof. Consider a group G of individuals, and assume that for all
i, j!G Vi=Vj so that we may simply refer to any individual’s infor-
mation partition as V. It is easy to show that this assumption is
harmless, although dropping the assumption makes the proof
cumbersome.
Define the closure of v for G, denoted CL(v,G), as the smallest set
meeting the following two conditions:
. v!CL(v,G)
. For any i!G, if v9!CL(v,G) then ki(v9)!CL(v,G)
Clearly, if V is finite, then so is CL(v,G).
Consider an event E and an arbitrary i!G. In order for E to be
known to  leve l  k ,  then for  ever y  m # k ,  and ever y  x i !G ,
( ( … (v) … ) " E .  Clearly, there are at most | G | x
statements that must be true.
Choose a value of k such that |G| x > |CL(v,G) | . We are guaran-
teed that there is such a value of k because CL(v,G) is finite if V is.
Suppose that E is known to level k. It is sufficient to show that E is
also known to level k + . For this, it is sufficient to show that
( ( … (v) … ) " E for some arbitrary series of xis in G.
Because |G| x > |CL(v,G)|, then by a pigeonhole argument, there
must be some ( ( … (v) … ), !<k+ such that ( ( …
(v) … ) = ( ( … (v) … ). But by assumption, ( ( …
(v) … ) " E , so ( ( … (v) … ) " E, which completes the
proof.
kx kx kxm S
k–
x=
S
k–
x=
kx kx kxk+1
S
k–
x=
ky ky ky! ky ky
ky! kx kx kxk+1 kx kx
kxk+1 ky ky ky!
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Theorem  has a simple informal justification. Recall that two possible
worlds are elements of the same partition of V if and only if the agent is
unable to distinguish between them. So agents who often cannot distin-
guish between various possible worlds will have partitions that place
many different possible worlds in the same equivalence class of V. The
condition that |V| is finite therefore amounts to saying that the agents
can distinguish among only a finite number of possible worlds. In this
case, there will be some highest order of interactive knowledge above
which the agent cannot discriminate. Thus, any set of agents achieving
that level of interactive knowledge with respect to some proposition is
in an epistemic state that is indistinguishable (given their cognitive lim-
itations) from common knowledge.
It is also helpful to informally motivate how the value of n is calcu-
lated in Theorem . The theorem assures us that for each agent A, there
is some finite number n such that if A has interactive knowledge of
some proposition p to degree n, then A’s interactive knowledge of p is
indistinguishable from full-blown common knowledge. Let us call n the
‘threshold’ for A. The question is what Theorem  tells us about how A’s
threshold is determined.
For simplicity, let us consider a simple case in which there are only
two agents, whom we shall call A and B. The theory of interactive epis-
temology using information partitions identifies each event —
including the event of some proposition being known by an agent—
with some information partition. So consider a unary function ‘!’ over
information partitions, where ‘!p’ is interpreted as ‘A knows that B
knows that p’. Because the semantics of interactive knowledge treats the
knowledge of an event as just another event, the ! function will take
information partitions and map them onto information partitions.
Theorem  assures us that if there are only finitely many information
partitions, then there will be some threshold n such that !np is the
same partition as !mp, where m<n. A trivial induction shows that for
any ,> n, there will exist some ,9#n such that !,p=!,9p. So if A’s
interactive knowledge of p has already reached the threshold n, then A
has every higher level of interactive knowledge of p also.
The existence of some finite threshold value n is guaranteed if |V| is
finite. But it is important to note that the existence of such a threshold
does not require |V| to be finite. All that is required is that there be
some n>m such that !np=!mp. Of course, because Theorem () is only
a formal result, it is appropriately silent about any empirical facts that
would explain why some higher level of interactive knowledge would be
treated like a lower level of interactive knowledge. But an explanation
 a
t U
n
iv
e
rs
ity
 o
f M
is
s
o
u
ri-C
o
lu
m
b
ia
 o
n
 M
a
y
 1
1
, 2
0
1
1
m
in
d
.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
a
ls
.o
rg
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 
568 Sara Rachel Chant and Zachary Ernst
Mind, Vol. 117 .  467 . July 2008 © Chant and Ernst 2008
for many such cases would be that the agents have cognitive limitations
that prevent them from distinguishing among every possible level of
interactive knowledge. This simple observation sheds some light on the
paradoxical flavour of the Coordinated Attack Problem. Specifically,
the two generals are hurt by their own cognitive superiority. Because
each is assumed to be able to distinguish between any two distinct levels
of higher-order knowledge, then they must have (at least) a countably
infinite partition of V. If their rationality were bounded, then after
some finite number of confirmations, we would expect them to suc-
cessfully coordinate their actions. And of course, this is just what we
would intuitively expect.
Because we have argued that an agent’s having lower levels of interac-
tive knowledge may sometimes entail her having higher levels of inter-
active knowledge, we raise the question of whether this is generally the
case. In particular, if an agent’s threshold value is n, then the question is
whether, having reached interactive knowledge of level n–, the agent
will be able to reason as if she had interactive knowledge to degree n,
and thereby achieve the equivalent of common knowledge.
We believe that there is no univocal answer to this question. Suppose
that an agent A reasons to nth-order interactive knowledge of p. It may
turn out that the reasoning employed by A may in principle be reiter-
ated without additional information to level n+. Thus, if A is rational
enough to recognize that fact and carry out the induction, then A’s
threshold may, in effect, be lowered. But from this example, we may not
draw the conclusion that cognitive superiority and idealized rationality
must allow an agent to bootstrap her interactive knowledge to degree n
into degree n+. Indeed, this is the lesson we learn from the Coordi-
nated Attack Problem, in which we have ideally rational agents who are
prevented from leveraging arbitrarily high levels of interactive knowl-
edge into common knowledge.
4.2 Mutual knowledge
In spite of the emphasis on interactive knowledge, there are also cases
in which no interactive knowledge is required for the performance of
collective action. Recall that a proposition p is mutual knowledge if eve-
ryone knows that p; mutual knowledge does not require that the agents
are aware of each others’ knowledge of p.
Consider the simple Coordination Game depicted in Figure . In it,
players receive a payoff if they coordinate their actions, but receive
nothing if they miscoordinate. Here, only mutual knowledge is
required because the penalty for miscoordination is no worse than the
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status quo (for we assume that if the players simply walked away from
the game, then each would receive a payoff of zero), and there is no
incentive for either party to deliberately miscoordinate.
For example, suppose that you and I are playing a coordination game,
and we have decided that we shall conditionalize our behavior on some
external signal; let us assume that if we observe the signal, then we will
play A, otherwise we will play B. Having determined this strategy, sup-
pose that you observe the signal. Clearly, it is in your best interest to
play A, regardless of whether you know that I have observed the signal.
After all, the structure of the game does not give me any incentive to
deliberately miscoordinate, or ‘play it safe’ by not playing strategy A.
Because the situation is symmetric, I shall also reason in the same way.
So if we have mutual knowledge of the signal, then that weak level of
interactive knowledge will be sufficient to ensure that we perform the
collective action of coordinating our strategies.
5. Solving the problem of Alfonse and Gaston
David Velleman has directed a particularly interesting objection to
Michael Bratman’s theory of shared cooperative activity; a response to
this objection is suggested by considering the role played by interactive
knowledge.
Velleman (, p. ) argues that Bratman’s theory of collective
intention would fail to ever produce a collective action because each
individual’s intention is conditional upon the intentions of the other
person. For example, Bratman discusses a case in which two people are
required in order to pump water into a house—let us say that Abe must
pump the water while Betty turns a valve. On Bratman’s account of col-
lective intention, Abe will have the intention to pump the water if Betty
turns the valve, while Betty will have the intention to turn the valve if
Abe pumps the water. According to Velleman, these two ‘conditional’
intentions would be insufficient to bring about their collective action.
Instead, they will behave like the vaudeville characters Alfonse and Gas-
Player II
,,
, ,
a b
a
b
Player I
Figure 3: The Coordination Game
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ton, who are unable to walk through a doorway because each of them
politely waits for the other to go first.
Bratman’s response to this worry is to point out that in such a case,
one person’s behavior can be settled by observing that the other has
‘done his part’. In the example, we may suppose that Abe recognizes
Betty’s conditional intention, and therefore simply starts pumping the
water, knowing that Betty will observe him doing so and will thereby be
encouraged to turn the valve. Here, Bratman is correct to point out that
either person could rationally do her part of the collective action, acting
on the assumption that by doing so, the other member of the group will
be led to perform her part of the collective action. Bratman summarizes
his response in the following way:
… I can ‘frame’ the intention that we J in part on the assumption that you
will, as a result, come also so to intend. While I confidently predict you will
come so to intend, I also recognize that you remain a free agent and this de-
cision is really up to you … Second, even after I have formed the intention
that we J, in part because I predict you will concur, I can recognize that you
still need to concur: It is just that I am fully confident that you will. (Bratman
, p. )
Bratman’s discussion of this particular case is perfectly sound; indeed,
it is easy to come up with similar examples in which one person’s inten-
tion to participate in the collective action is settled when that person
observes the participation of others. However, we believe that consider-
ations of interactive knowledge provide a more general response to this
kind of worry, and we also believe that a more general response is nec-
essary. After all, it is important to note that an ‘Alfonse and Gaston’
objection could be made in regard to cases where no person in the
group can observe the others’ participation. A simple example is the
one discussed above, in which we must coordinate our actions contin-
gent upon some external signal. It may be the case that we are perfectly
justified in adjusting our strategies accordingly, even if we are unable to
observe each other. In such a case, Bratman’s response will not apply.
However, an interactive knowledge framework makes it clear that
Bratman’s example is simply one way in which an agent can gain inter-
active knowledge of another agent’s beliefs and actions. In other words,
what makes Bratman’s case a reasonable reply to Velleman’s objection is
that the case demonstrates that the presence of interactive knowledge
allows the agents to avoid becoming mired in a situation where their
conditional intentions are never executed. For when the level of inter-
active knowledge is appropriate to the strategic situation, it may
become rational for each agent to act.
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Once we learn this general lesson from Bratman’s example, it
becomes clear that there are many other ways in which an appropriate
level of interactive knowledge can be achieved. And indeed, as we have
seen above, there are cases in which the level of interactive knowledge
required is extremely low—so low, in fact, that the agents may ration-
ally act without having any assurance that the other agents will act
similarly.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that theories of collective action can
benefit by taking into account the role played by interactive knowledge.
In one respect, this lesson is not new—for as we have seen, virtually all
accounts of collective intention make recourse to interactive knowledge
in some way or other. However, the obviousness of the fact that interac-
tive knowledge does play such a role belies the fact that it may do so in
complex ways.
Accordingly, we have argued in this paper that the role played by
interactive knowledge is much richer and more complex than has been
appreciated. In particular, different levels of interactive knowledge may
be required, depending upon the strategic situation in which the agents
find themselves. Furthermore, interactive knowledge is not always
helpful in bringing about collective action—occasionally, collective
action will be possible only when a particular threshold level of interac-
tive knowledge is not reached.
Interactive knowledge has an unusual place in the literature on col-
lective intention. On the one hand, interactive knowledge is taken to be
of central importance to virtually all accounts of collective intention.
But surprisingly, it is not an exaggeration to say that almost no effort
has been devoted to analysing it. Thus, we believe that the potential
payoff for analysing interactive knowledge — particularly within
Aumann’s framework—is substantial. For we suspect that a number of
open problems that arise in discussions of collective intention and col-
lective action may be illuminated by an account of interactive
knowledge. To take just one example, if moral responsibility depends
upon the epistemic state of the agent—as seems perfectly reasonable to
suppose — then it may turn out that analyses of collective moral
responsibility can benefit from a better understanding of how interac-
tive knowledge is distributed and generated within a group.
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